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R ® is a registered trademark. . The system has also been implemented at the 50 busiest land ports of entry. Exit kiosks are being installed at ports so that visitors can record their exit from the United States. Fundamentally, US-VISIT is an electronic system for verifying a traveler's identity and ensuring that the traveler is not sought by a law enforcement agency. Congress mandated that the U.S. Immigration and Naturalization Service develop a system for monitoring visitor access to the United States in 1996. Congress subsequently deferred the program's implementation from October 15, 1998 , to March 30, 2001 , fearing increased congestion at U.S. border crossings (U.S. Department of Homeland Security, 2005). However, the attacks of September 11, 2001, provided a motivation for development and implementation. Now, DHS entities U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP), U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS), and U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) maintain and operate the US-VISIT system. The US-VISIT system consists of user terminals, databases, and communication links that allow a CBP inspector to collect a visitor's biographic and biometric information and compare it against criminal watch lists, lists of foreign students, and accepted and rejected visa holders. US-VISIT is being implemented in four increments, with the first initiated in January 2004, and the final configuration of the system available near the end of the decade. Proper operation requires the coordination of the component databases, each of which is monitored by a different government agency, and the maintenance of the communication links among the subsystems. Because US-VISIT data are personal and sensitive, care is required to maintain personal privacy and security.
In the mid-1980s, when France was the victim of a series of terrorist attacks, it tightened its immigration and visitor controls by means of the "Pasqua Laws." Visa requirements were imposed on all visitors from countries other than those of the then-European Community, and Liechtenstein, Monaco, Andorra, and Switzerland. The European Community convened meetings on appropriate responses to terrorism, including increased airport security. Affected nations, including the United States, reacted negatively to the new requirements, processes, and procedures for obtaining a visa. Within France, there were complaints of program mismanagement and warnings of deleterious effects on travel and trade. There are many parallels between France's actions in 1986 and U.S. actions today in response to terrorist attacks. Imposition of a visa requirement in France seems to have had no long-term negative economic impact on trade and tourism; the visa requirement led to an initial drop in immigration that persisted for several years. The international community seems to have understood that a trade-off can be made between free access and national security. Similar drops may be less desirable in the United States, particularly for seasonal workers and students. The effects of the French visa requirements were felt in the context of a larger, intentionally restrictive immigration policy; US-VISIT's effects must be viewed in the same larger context, with reasoned consideration of what the United States would like to accomplish through regulation of immigration and border controls.
These lessons, coupled with a detailed view of the workings of US-VISIT, enable us to identify key policy questions that should be discussed as the system is implemented, and expanded throughout the decade. These questions include the following:
How can database and communication links be made reliable and available? How can the user interface be designed to speed processing and minimize human error? How can the design of US-VISIT ensure privacy and incorporate fair information practices, including limitations on the government's ability to collect and disclose data inappropriately, guarantees of security, and opportunities for stakeholders-including the foreign visitors themselves-to petition for redress and correction of the data? How can US-VISIT guarantee proper coordination among the disparate government agencies that control data used by US-VISIT to segregate legitimate travelers (such as students, tourists, and business visitors) from criminals? How can US-VISIT and related processes, such as Department of State consular services, be monitored so that the United States can minimize their effects on legitimate travel, trade, and tourism?
These policy issues in particular, and our analysis in general, suggest several targets of future inquiry.
US-VISIT is a complicated technological and interagency-implemented system that will affect all visitors to the United States. An independent analysis of US-VISIT com-
